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Abstract: Transableism is a term which refers to moving between states of 
being able and disabled by choice rather than by happenstance. 
Insofar as this may imply a choice to become dependent, claims 
upon the healthcare system are likely to result. In this piece we aim 
to explore some ethical and legal implications of such claims. In 
order to do so, we draw upon current debates over the place of 
autonomy, beneficence and paternalism in public health ethics, the 
taxonomy of disability and the status of persistent unexplained 
physical symptoms (henceforth, PUPS). We suggest that 
transableism represents a useful construct which may contribute 
towards resolution of ongoing difficulties within public health ethics 
and theories of disability. In addition, we believe that it holds promise 
for the understanding of a significant proportion of patients 
presenting PUPS. We focus upon identity disorders, particularly in 
relation to what is currently termed Body Integrity Identity Disorder 
(henceforth, BIID), where sufferers report a subjective conviction that 
one or more of their limbs are superfluous, requesting medical 
assistance to remove the offending limb[s], repair the results of 
attempts at their self-removal or to provide prostheses and other 
assistance after removal. We have considered BIID elsewhere in 
relation to consent, capacity and the doctor/patient relationship 
(Mackenzie and Cox, 2005). One of us has also explored how the 
definition of addiction as a chronic relapsing disease within public 
health governance enables cycles of transitions between the rigours 
of rational liberal citizenship and the shriven status of the sick 
(Mackenzie, 2006). Since a central aim in this piece is evaluate the 
place of transableism within public health ethics, we 
will begin by considering the latter as a discursive context for the 
arguments which follow. 







Kent Academic Repository – http://kar.kent.ac.uk  
Published version available in ‘International Journal of Law in Context 2 (4) pp 363 – 375’ 
- 2 - 
 
 
Autonomy, choice and claims upon healthcare resources 
 
Much debate today over healthcare ethics focuses upon scope and language. While the traditional 
emphasis of medical ethics has been upon the doctor/patient relationship, that of public health is 
upon whole populations, either national or global. Consequently, while these fields may deploy 
identical ethical terms, the ways in which these will apply are likely to differ. While the history of 
the doctor/patient relationship has often been read as a successful battle for patient autonomy as 
against medical paternalism couched as beneficence, attempts to contain autonomy’s paramountcy 
are being mounted increasingly today, both within clinical care and public health arenas. For 
instance, Brazier characterises her recent effort to accomplish the dethroning of what she terms the 
great god Autonomy in order to suggest that patients should bear responsibilities as well as rights as 
an attempt to maintain medical integrity in the face of moves towards a medical consumerism which 
threatens to reduce clinicians to body technicians (Brazier, 2006). Similarly, it has been argued that 
the lawful or obligatory exercise of power and deployment of resources to maximise health may be 
incompatible with strong patient autonomy: as many public health measures must of necessity be 
uniform and compulsory, autonomy is an inappropriate guiding principle (O’Neill, 2002a). To an 
extent, such differences reflect and sustain wider ethicopolitical choices between policies based upon 
welfare liberalism, traditional communitarianism and radical libertarianism (Hayry, 2005). How 
these should impact upon public health and clinical care is unclear. Certainly each perspective will 
favour a specific variant of the doctor/patient relationship. Brazier and O’Neill’s emphasis upon trust 
and beneficence as opposed to autonomy may be seen as promoting communitarianism, as may 
Stirrat and Gill’s suggestion that the doctor/patient relationship be seen as a covenant (Brazier, 2006; 
O’Neill, 2002b; Stirrat and Gill, 2005). 
 
Where the role of autonomy, beneficence and paternalism in public health ethics is concerned, 
it is important to distinguish between the elements associated with public health initiatives. The 
constraining of citizen autonomy associated with public health powers to restrain and quarantine 
those with infectious disease may rest uneasily beside the human rights based temper of our times, 
yet few would regard them as unjustifiable. However, the censuring of lifestyle choices associated 
with deleterious health consequences appears to many as moralising couched in medical terms. 
As Smith puts it, the ‘frequent concordance of morality and what passes at any particular time as 
the science of public health must surely be more than coincidence’ (Smith, 2001, p. 329). Public 
health taxonomies, such as those which have created obesity as an epidemic of chronic disease, 
with dire implications for future health status, depleting scarce healthcare resources and the result of 
sloth and greed, do so on a basis of suspect science (Gard and Wright, 2005). Consequently, attempts 
to allocate healthcare preferentially to the deserving unwell, such as the recent National Institute 
of Clinical Excellence guidelines on IVF treatment for the obese, while they may be couched in 
terms of probabilistic clinical outcomes, arouse unease. Indeed, NICE’s 2005 guidelines on selfinflicted 
harm have been condemned as incoherent (Holm, 2006). Autonomy and beneficence 
in this context take on more contested meanings, as do taxonomies of health and ill health 
(Mackenzie, 2006). 
 
Transableism represents a nexus for these concerns. Public health promotion campaigns which 
seek to persuade us to eschew excessive indulgence in pleasures which may result in ill health have 
generally failed to persuade us to do so. In part, this is caused by a general response of healthy 
scepticism. Many of us fail to be convinced that our lifestyle choices are seriously harmful, nor that 
their possible health consequences should affect our entitlement to healthcare subsequently. Yet 
where the harm and the consequences are unequivocal, and result from autonomous choice, many 
agree that ideas of desert colour the usual assumption that healthcare should be provided according 
to need. In the United Kingdom recently, the allocation of a second liver to George Best, a famous 
alcoholic ex-football star who continued to consume alcohol, and eventually died from the failure of 
his second liver, aroused wide public condemnation. Those who choose to engage on behaviours 
which will undoubtedly result in ill health, consuming healthcare resources thereby, may be seen as 
harming others as well as themselves. The resources necessary to provide me with my second liver 
may mean your baby, who is born prematurely, dies because the facilities necessary to keep her alive 
cannot be funded. Does this mean I must take on an obligation to eschew alcohol if I am to receive a 
second liver? These ethical issues are rendered more complex as treatments which remedy excess 
become available. Sulphasalazine, a drug which may heal the liver of chronic alcoholics, is about to 
begin clinical trials in the United Kingdom, while other pharmaceuticals promise the prospect of 
maintaining a healthy weight and muscle tone despite overindulgence (Templeton, 2006). If I pay for 
my own Sulphasalazine, and continue to consume excess alcohol, whom do I harm? Should I be 
required to fund my own medical treatment for the consequences of my choices in this way? And, if 
so, on what grounds? 
 
The issues traversed so far demonstrate that, to an extent, these debates reduce to choices over 
where and how to assign obligations to provide healthcare resources, and justifications for refusing 
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them. Mirroring these concerns are questions over how far patients might be expected to assume 
commensurate obligations and of what these might consist. For example, public health preventative 
campaigns might be read as constructing a duty to be well. Measures of harm may then reduce to 
estimates of how far one places demands which result from previous choices upon healthcare 
resources. The relationship between the place of paternalism within public health ethics and 
theories of disability will now be explored in this light, in order to provide a theoretical context 
for our model of transableism. We have chosen to focus upon BIID and PUPS as illustrations of how 
the term transableism may help to understand a significant proportion of claims made on the public 
healthcare system and where the limits of paternalism might lie in relation to these. 
 
Beneficence, autonomy and paternalism in public health ethics 
 
Taxonomic boundaries between health, ill health and disability are fluid and contested, especially 
when these intersect with notions of choice, need and claims on healthcare resources (Biggs and 
Mackenzie, 2000). Public health both creates and polices these definitions. How far citizens should be 
able to make claims to healthcare resources on the basis of clinical need, and how far their lifestyle 
choices should affect their entitlement, is partially determined by public health taxonomies of 
health, ill health and disability. For instance, a very fat person may be condemned as having exercised 
inappropriate lifestyle choices and be denied IVF until they lose weight, or be diagnosed as morbidly 
obese and offered gut stapling surgery, or be allocated special assistance on grounds of disability. 
Contingent policies over the relationship between autonomy and paternalism within public health 
underpin this categorisation process. Adjudication here is complex. Public health goals of producing 
benefits, reducing or preventing harms and maximising utility in healthcare are unlikely to be 
completely compatible with principles familiar within medical ethics. In addition, views on the 
place of protective paternalism within public health vary (Grill and Hansson, 2005). Childress et al. 
have proposed five ‘justificatory conditions’ which may resolve conflicts among such general moral 
considerations in public health ethics: effectiveness, proportionality, necessity, least infringement 
and public justification (Childress et al., 2002). Nonetheless, these means fail to resolve issues 
surrounding the acceptability of paternalism where an individual’s actions are voluntary and selfregarding 
(i.e. likely to affect adversely that individual alone) rather than other-regarding (i.e. adverse 
consequences are likely to affect others primarily). Childress et al. characterise this sense of paternalism 
as morally interesting and problematic. It is this aspect of paternalism within public health ethics 
which we wish to consider briefly now in relation to our subsequent exploration of transableism. 
Paternalism is not inherently unjustifiable. Weak or soft paternalism is accepted as appropriate 
in cases involving protection of those engaged in non-voluntary self-regarding practices, and may 
indeed be welcomed by those in dependent positions interpreting it as beneficence. Paternalistic 
practices may also be helpfully employed to maximise the autonomy of those in positions of 
dependence who possess less than full autonomy, as exemplified in s. 4(4) of the Mental Capacity 
Act 2005. Yet strong or hard paternalistic coercive interventions into voluntary self-regarding 
conduct would, according to Childress et al: 
 
‘be insulting and disrespectful to individuals because it would override their voluntary actions 
for their own benefit, even though their actions do not harm others. Such actions are thus very 
difficult to justify in a liberal, pluralistic democracy.’ (Childress et al., p. 176) 
 
Ethical inquiry into justifiable limitations on paternalism must then focus on degrees of voluntariness 
in individuals’ decisions and the extent to which their conduct can be said to harm others. 
Childress et al. make the salient point that, when calculating harm, including many elements such as 
financial and emotional costs to society ‘can appear to make virtually any intervention nonpaternalistic’, 
but that the central ethical issue is whether the significance of the costs justifies the 
intervention (Childress et al., p.176). In our view, these costs are particularly difficult to assess where 
those making a claim upon healthcare resources do so from dependent positions which fall outside 
current diagnostic categories. In addition, where such dependence may arise from choice, how far 
paternalistic intervention may be justified is contentious. The remainder of this article will explore 
these difficulties in relation to transableism, identity disorders located in the body and PUPS, first 
drawing upon theories of disability and recent advances in neuroscience. 
 
Public health ethics and theories of disability 
 
Many criticise policies for the disabled as insufficiently examined, reductionist and stigmatising 
(Danermark and Gellerstedt, 2004; Goodlad and Riddell, 2005; Silver, 1998, 2003). Such commentators 
argue that policies designed to promote social justice have been tainted, and the citizenship of those 
with physical impairments compromised (Danermark and Gellerstedt, 2004; Goodlad and Riddell, 
2005). The validity of varying concepts of disability is central here. Critics of the medico-individualist 
deficit model, wherein a person is seen as having a disability in the field of health, employment or 
education which must be corrected, have asserted that the terms normal and abnormal embody social 
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judgements which distinguish between acceptable and unacceptable biological variations and levels 
of functioning (Amundsen, 2000). The strategies of identity politics have supported a social model of 
disability as an identity imposed upon the basis of physical impairment. This has sustained a politics of 
resistance which moves away from the typology of disability as a personal tragedy towards a model 
framing it a form of social exclusion (Hughes and Paterson, 1997). Recently, however, oppositions 
between the presence and absence of disability have been condemned as an overly essentialist strategy 
obscuring the diversity of voices within the many cultural factors associated with disability (Corker 
and Shakespeare, 2002). Listening to these voices is seen as a means of recognising difference and 
diversity within and amongst cultures which enables the formulation of alternative truths moving 
beyond the association of disability and disadvantage (Clapton, 2003; Silver, 2003). 
These theoretical portrayals of disability have played a part in public health ethics principally 
within the debates over the morality of reproductive choice in relation to genetic conditions. These 
have been shaped by ideas of impairment versus disability, along with the three models of disability 
as a biomedical condition causing disadvantage, a socially created label of disabled superimposed on 
impairment and a discursively constructed notion of disability allowing for the possibility of resistance 
through a recognition of diversity and difference. Disagreements over conceptions of ‘normal’ and the 
politics of normalisation continue. 
 
This impacts on the subject matter of this article in that public health policies rely upon evidence 
bases derived fromepidemiological investigations. The state’s interest in the health of its citizenry has a 
particular resonance for public health ethics, since the characteristics of any population will be 
categorised, statistically, as either normal or abnormal. While there is no necessary connection 
between a quality which falls either inside or outside a statistical norm and that quality’s being 
assigned normative value, slippage between the two happens, and gives rise to concern. The term 
‘abnormal’ has acquired pejorative force. In addition, within the health lexicon, it suggests a condition 
in need of a remedy, treatment or cure so that it might fit within the norm. Ethical issues arise as a 
result of this linguistic imperative that the abnormal should be subjected to normalisation. As public 
health methodology is aetiological and its orientation preventative and remedial, it seems plausible 
that it would prove particularly vulnerable to presumptions of normalisation as a built-in moral hazard 
where slippage takes place. The biomedical conception of disability espoused within public health 
policies means that conditions which may be experienced subjectively as embodying difference and 
diversity are more likely to be officially envisaged as disabilities in need of prevention or remedy. 
Those seeking to theorise disability have engaged with the difficulties which this orientation is 
likely to cause for those who might wish to preserve their differences rather than have them labeled 
as disabilities and subjected to blanket medical treatments. Silvers distinguishes between disability 
and ill health in order to condemn the coercion involved in the normalising strategies of public 
health initiatives which seek to render the different as close as possible to the ‘normal’ (Silvers 1998, 
2003). Clapton argues that medical ethics constructs the human good in such a way as to marginalise 
those with disabilities as ‘inferior others’ (Clapton, 2003). Others cite examples of amputees who 
would prefer wheelchairs to prosthetic legs which render movement more unstable, along with 
those born with different limbs as a result of thalidomide who would have wished to retain them 
rather than have them amputated and replaced with prostheses, and those in deaf communities who 
have no desire for hearing aids for themselves or for cochlear implants for their children (Danermark 
and Gellstedt, 2004; Silvers, 1998, 2003). In similar vein, many of those born intersex who were 
provided with approximations of male or female genitalia have subsequently expressed the wish that 
they had been accepted as different rather than condemned as abnormal and subjected to surgical 
normalisation in childhood. 
 
This emphasis on the acceptance of difference and diversity has ethical implications for how 
public health should treat disability. If people with disabilities are not to be perceived as having a 
unifying group identity, means of ensuring social justice do not hinge simply upon remedial medical 
treatment and prevention but more broadly upon inculcating means by which parity of participation 
in civic life might be ensured. There is a growing consensus that dialogues involving individual 
narratives, counter-truths and parrhesias, or risky truths, offer the most promise here (Clapton, 2003; 
Corker and Shakespeare, 2002; Danermark and Gellstedt, 2004; Hughes and Paterson, 1997; 
Meekosha 2004; Silvers, 1998, 2003). Silvers promotes the strategy of working towards a neutral 
conception of disability, arguing that disability is an essentially contested concept. As a consequence, 
she favours dialogue leading towards a ‘neutral account of disability [which] will ground rehabilitation 
strategies in a sensible and sensitive paradigm of the relation between a functionally diverse 
citizenry and an inclusive state’ (Silvers, 2003, p. 485). 
 
Within such a model, distinctions between disability, dependence and ill health are crucial. The 
inclusive state has an obligation to citizens suffering from impairments to provide means by which 
their ability to participate in civic life might be fostered. In other words, dependence which results 
from impairment is to be transformed into independence or autonomy. Those suffering from ill 
health have a different claim on the state, that of healthcare ideally leading to a cure, or, where this is 
not possible, to support for their dependent state. The provision of healthcare for chronic conditions, 
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then, assumes that a degree of patient dependence is inevitable, not only because this is inherent in 
the doctor/patient relationship but also in that less can be expected of us when we are ill. Once we 
have the identity of a person with a long-term illness, we have a claim to medical attention, comfort 
care and acceptance of our dependent state. Here, then, paternalistic support is accepted, welcomed 
and provided as of right. Yet public health policies seeking to minimise dependence resulting from 
disability and ill health are contentious. State provision of technology allowing reproductive choices 
to prevent disabled children from being born has been both condemned as covert eugenics and 
acclaimed as promoting reproductive autonomy. In similar vein, public health campaign exhortations 
to eschew smoking, drinking alcohol, eating salty and fatty foods and pursuing sedentary 
lifestyles may be viewed as appropriate promotion of responsible autonomy or the overly paternalistic 
(or maternalistic) interventions of the nanny state. 
 
The rest of this article will introduce transableism, then explore how this might impact upon the 
proposed neutral account of disability in order to consider how this might relate to an appropriate 
role for paternalism within public health ethics. Recent advances in neuroscience which affect ideas 
of voluntariness and bodily located identity disorders will be drawn upon. 
 
Transableism: amputees, devotees and wannabes 
 
Transableism is a term which refers to moving between states of being able bodied and disabled by 
choice rather than happenstance. Outside a neutral conception of disability, then, it may imply a choice 
to become dependent. Its linguistic genealogy is uncertain. We have been working with the concept for 
some time. However, claims to have invented it have also been put forward by paradevo, the operator of a 
website, http://www.transabled.org , which caters for those wishing to share their thoughts and experiences 
about the process of moving amongst different degrees and types of able bodiedness and those 
involved in this. Paradevo makes an explicit comparison between transableists and the transgendered, or 
transsexuals, i.e. those ho undertake hormonal or surgical treatment in order to move between genders 
after being diagnosed as suffering from Gender Identity Disorder, or GID. While the latter have found 
social and medical acceptance, the former have not. Specific terms to describe those involved in internet 
groups such as http://www.transabled.com  have arisen. Devotees are those who are erotically attracted to 
specific characteristics of those ho are not able bodied, while wannabes are the able bodied who wish to 
transform themselves into the disabled, whether via self-demand amputation, deliberately induced 
paralysis or other forms of bodily alteration generally regarded as self-harm. Researchers who have 
published in this area usually focus upon those who wish to have limbs amputated, who are often seen 
as suffering from a medical condition termed Body Integrity Identity Disorder, or BIID (Bayne and Levy, 
2005; Berger, 2005; First, 2005; Furth, 2000; Johnston and Elliott, 2002; Jordan, 2004). However, this 
condition does not appear in the current edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual for Mental 
Disorders, DSM-IV, and may not be seen as meeting the criteria for that due out in 2010. 
Ethical debate has centred upon balancing the right of those requesting amputations to make 
autonomous decisions about their own bodies with doctors’ responsibilities to their patients to alleviate 
suffering and provide appropriate treatment. At issue has been the question of whether amputating a 
healthy limb can be seen in this light. Within a legal frame, this translates as an interrogation of the 
limits of autonomous consent in relation to harm (Johnston and Elliott, 2002). In addition, the 
parameters of the doctor’s duty of care come into question: these are defined by the presence of a 
responsible body of opinion, or professional guidelines, on disorders recognised as medical conditions 
with a range of acceptable treatments. This is not the case with BIID, where the paucity of cases, the 
anecdotal nature of the assurances that amputation provides a permanent alleviation of suffering and 
the reliance upon the testimony of support groups on the internet taken together render the safeguards 
of evidence based clinical practice impossible to obtain. As a consequence, doctors who wish to accede 
to a request to amputate a healthy limb in order to relieve suffering, even where patients are able to 
produce evidence from psychiatrists that they are not mentally disordered, and have undergone other 
forms of treatment without success, are placing themselves in professional peril should they proceed 
with the operation. As we have written on this topic elsewhere, we do not propose to do anything other 
than provide this sketchy account of issues surrounding treatment for BIID (Mackenzie and Cox, 2005). 
Instead, we now wish to consider how recent developments in neuroscience might impact on voluntariness 
and hence the appropriate limits of paternalism in public health ethics. 
 
Neuroscience, voluntariness and paternalism 
 
For a decision to be voluntary, it must be made by a person from a position of autonomy, or, in legal 
terms, competence. This implies that the decision should be made freely: while it might be irrational, 
provided it has not been improperly influenced by another, or undermined by incapacity, an 
autonomous choice should be respected. Nonetheless, the relationship between judgements that a 
specific decision is irrational and the classification of the person making the decision as lacking the 
capacity to make an autonomous decision is clearly a vexed one. One of the issues here is the 
relationship between autonomy and aetiology. Where, say, a person refuses to eat, considering 
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themselves to be too fat, a diagnosis of anorexia may be made and compulsory feeding may take 
place lawfully as treatment for what is seen as a mental disorder, anorexia. The refusal of treatment 
[food] may be seen as able to be overridden as it is not a sign of autonomy but a symptom of the 
mental disorder anorexia. Yet the lack of an accepted causative mechanism for anorexia, along with 
the gloomy prognosis even where force feeding takes place, creates a feeling of unease where an 
allegation that incapacity caused by anorexia justifies the overriding of a decision not to eat, however 
irrational such a decision may appear to be. 
 
The desire to amend bodily form associated with a complex of conditions known as identity 
disorders raises similar ethical issues over voluntariness. While the medical profession is now routinely 
involved in a gatekeeping role regulating access to gender reassignment procedures for those 
diagnosed as suffering from GID, how far this should be seen as a medical or mental disorder has 
remained a contested question for nearly half a century. Both GID and BIID are associated with groups 
of patients who claim medical treatment involving surgery on the grounds that their identities, or their 
subjective views of their authentic selves, do not conform with their bodies as they are presently 
constituted. Surgical intervention may be justified on the basis that the degree of suffering associated 
with such fixed beliefs over identity cannot be relieved otherwise, since medication and cognitive 
behavioural therapy have proven largely unsuccessful in doing so. Hence the fact that the beliefs and 
suffering remain unamenable to persuasion underpins the classification of a form of identity disorder. 
Yet as the aetiology of these disorders remains contentious, the status of the request for medical 
intervention to support a fixed notion of subjective identity is uncertain. 
 
Recent advances in neuroscience appear to offer some promise here. Studies have demonstrated 
that our brains contain neurally based ‘body schema’, or representations of our bodies. These impact 
on what have been seen in terms of identity disorders, body dysmorphia and anorexia in that each of 
these is implicated in subjective perceptions of the body which do not conform with those found in 
inter-subjective reality. In other words, those with identity disorders do not perceive themselves as 
being ‘really’ the person of a particular gender, or with the complement of limbs, with which they 
were born; those with body dysmorphia consider parts of their body to be intolerably diseased or 
unattractive and those with anorexia perceive themselves as too fat, even when they are dangerously 
thin. Ehrsson et al. have carried out a series of experiments which suggest that the body schema 
mapped in the brain is generated by the parietal cortex, and that when the functioning of this area is 
disrupted, distortions in subjective perceptions of body shape and size result (Ehrsson et al., 2005a). 
In Ehrsson’s view, this ‘supports the idea that our brains compute our body size by integrating signals 
from the skin, muscles and joints, as well as visual cues’ (Ravilous, 2005). His team hopes that their 
research may lead to treatments for disorders such as anorexia. 
 
In addition, associated research carried out by Ehrsson et al. suggests that the parietal cortex is 
involved in the sense that one’s body, or parts of one’s body, are part of oneself (Ehrssson et al., 
2005b). Ehrsson et al. describe these results as supporting the hypothesis that the detection of 
correlated multi-sensory signals by the pre-motor, intraparietal and cerebellar regions provides the 
mechanism for feelings of body ownership. Hence an artificially induced integration of visual, tactile 
and proprioceptive information may give rise to the feeling that an artificial limb is part of our body. 
Thus, in some cases, neural correlation of intersensory input takes place in such a way as to make 
patterns which result in illusions which are experienced subjectively as real. This suggests that those 
who are diagnosed as suffering from identity disorders on the basis of subjective experiences of body 
ownership which do not conform with intersubjective judgements might be categorised by specific 
characteristics associated with their parietal cortices. In our view, this suggests that BIID and GID 
may offer potential for future research here. 
 
Yet, should such a connection be evidenced, how this might impact upon considerations of 
autonomy, voluntariness and paternalism remains contentious. Were a neutral conception of 
disability to be in place within public health and clinical decision-making, such characteristics 
might be interpreted as an example of diversity rather than abnormality in a pejorative sense, or 
abnormality as indicating a need for remediation. Nor would an ability to specify such characteristics 
necessarily imply a means to alter them. Nonetheless, where these hypothetical characteristics of the 
parietal cortex led to requests for surgical intervention, as in the amputation of a healthy limb or 
gender reassignment surgery, how voluntary might such requests be thought to be? 
Where subjective perceptions differ from those commonly accepted within intersubjective 
reality, attempts to anchor the perceptions in specific mechanisms or locations in the brain are 
liable to be condemned as reductionist, or as underestimating neural plasticity. In addition, invalidation 
of such subjective perceptions may be seen as unjustifiably reliant upon epistemological 
externalism. These issues may be sidelined to an extent where there has been damage to the brain, 
resulting in perceptual and behavioural manifestations, and all three variables are capable of being 
measured. Anderson and Lux have evaluated the impact of specific frontal brain injuries on 
behaviour and subjective perceptions in order to assert that ‘one’s autonomy is diminished to the 
extent to which one’s ability to assess one’s capacities is impaired . . . inaccurate self assessment 
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undermines the extent to which an action is one’s own’ (Anderson and Lux, 2004a, pp. 282–4). As the 
anterior brain regions are involved in the executive function of integrating information so that 
feedback mechanisms enable coherent, structured, adaptive and goal directed actions, Anderson and 
Lux suggest that ‘there is some degree of isomorphism between autonomy and executive function, in 
that deficits in executive function seem to correspond directly and closely with loss of autonomy’ 
(Anderson and Lux, 2004a, p. 288; 2004b). 
 
While Anderson and Lux do not consider the characteristics of the parietal cortex which in our 
view the research of the two teams led by Ehrsson suggests may contribute towards BIID and GID, 
their assertions rest upon observations of a neurologically induced general cognitive rigidity and 
incapacity to incorporate new information in a way which permits adaptation to perceptions of 
intersubjective reality. The fact that cognitive behavioural therapy and anti-psychotic medication 
have proven ineffectual in relation to similar subjective perceptions of identity in BIID and GID 
would tend to support our hypothesis that unidentified neurocognitive characteristics involving 
parietal cortex integration of subjective perceptions of body ownership and morphology are 
involved in the aetiology of these conditions. 
 
How might this relate to the place of paternalism and notions of disability within public health 
ethics where those with BIID request surgical intervention to amputate a healthy limb which is 
experienced subjectively as superfluous? According to the criteria suggested by Childress et al., ethical 
evaluation of a paternalistic intervention to prohibit amputation on request taking place would rest 
upon how voluntary the request might be seen as being, and on whether the significance of the costs to 
others justified the intervention (Childress et al., 2002). If a neutral conception of disability were to 
mandate that variations of parietal cortex function were to be interpreted as difference rather than 
disability, such a request would be unable to be dismissed as lacking in voluntariness because of an 
invalidating physical origin. In addition, the relationship between transableism and a neutral conception 
of disability would become salient. Silvers asserts that conceiving disability as normatively neutral 
places an ethical obligation upon the state to ensure equality of participation to all citizens, irrespective 
of their degree of ableism (Silvers, 2003). This implies that while means to ensure participatory equality 
should be available to all, normalisation should take place only where an autonomous request for it is 
made. A corollary of this is that autonomous decisions to move within varying states of able bodiedness 
should not be subjected axiomatically to normative condemnation, as a neutral conception of 
disability implies that transableism should be tolerated. The extent to which it should be enabled, if at 
all, is a separate ethical question. 
 
Yet how autonomous such requests might be seen as being is not straightforward. Ethical 
judgements over how far a decision to move from an able bodied to a disabled state can ever be 
adjudged autonomous rest upon one’s conception of how disability relates to autonomy. Where, 
under a neutral conception of disability, the state is obliged to provide means to remedy any 
participatory disadvantages associated with a disabled state, it might be thought that disability 
need not imply dependence, or anything less than full autonomy as conceptualised under John 
Stuart Mill’s liberal model. Yet this claim on state resources comes from an initial starting point of 
dependence triggered by a state of disability. How far, then, might a decision to move into such a state 
be seen as autonomous? 
 
According to Mill, one cannot make an autonomous decision to sell oneself into slavery: that is, it is 
not possible to decide with autonomy to live without autonomy. Indeed, if a patient provides evidence 
of a wish to relinquish autonomy completely through deliberately choosing to die, either through a 
refusal of life-saving treatment or an attempt to commit suicide, this precipitates an inquiry into that 
patient’s state of mind. The presumption within healthcare provision, as elsewhere, is that the autonomy 
of such a decision may be compromised by mental disturbances such as depression. Nonetheless, 
the possibility that decisions to refuse life-saving treatment or to commit suicide may not involve factors 
which would invalidate autonomy is recognised in English law. We may, then, autonomously relinquish 
our autonomy as defined by Mill completely provided we relinquish life at the same time. 
Nor does reading autonomy in Mill’s sense prevent our making an autonomous decision to 
compromise it. The aging King Lear’s decision to hand his daughters their patrimony and to rely 
upon their good will for his support may have been foolish, but was nonetheless autonomous. Under 
readings of autonomy as relational, to be human is to be a social being passing through different 
developmental stages, with mutual reliance, dependence and vulnerability thus rendering autonomy 
far from absolute in the liberal sense. Yet decisions to become vulnerable to another, or assumptions 
that another will care for us, usually take place within private rather than civic life, as there is an 
expectation that in the civic sphere we will wish to be autonomous. Altruism, mutuality and 
developmental dependencies are framed as contained by the private in this respect. Thus, despite 
the criticisms of feminists and others of the public/private distinction, while we might make an 
autonomous decision to compromise our autonomy by placing ourselves in a dependent position, 
our motives for doing so are likely to be seen as suspect if we then make a claim upon civic resources. 
Claims to civic care will usually succeed only where the need for it is seen as involuntarily 
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engendered. In current public health policy this translates into the recent initiatives seeking to 
restrict the healthcare entitlements of those seen as suffering from self-induced medical conditions, 
such as those caused by smoking. Taxonomy is crucial here. Where addictions are classified as 
diseases, an addict’s entitlement to healthcare resources is uncompromised by the moral opprobium 
which accompanies an alternative classification as evidence of weak character (Mackenzie, 2006). 
From the latter perspective, the public health paternalism of attempting to prevent self-induced 
harms to individuals by restricting healthcare associated with those harms is justified upon the 
grounds that such claims upon limited resources harm others whose healthcare needs are not selfinduced 
by leaving the others with diminished resources. This juxtaposition of self-induced harm 
with moral unworthiness leads to another kind of slippage where dependence, or a lack of autonomy, 
associated with choice becomes suspect. A forseeable consequence of this ethical stance is an 
increasing medicalisation of dependent states of being otherwise subject to moral condemnation. 
Many of us would prefer the identity of being ill than that of being a weak or wicked person. In 
addition, not all of us, for various reasons, wish to be, or are capable of being, autonomous at all 
times. We may experience a need to be dependent yet be unable to rely upon receiving adequate care 
in this dependent state in our private lives. Hence, in this context, public health policies which 
impose the expectation that members of the public will take autonomous responsibility for their 
health also lead to unforeseen consequences. Dependence upon paternalism as beneficence provided 
through public health services is fostered. The worried well regard themselves as permanently under 
threat of ill health, while those who for whatever reason feel unable to manifest the requisite 
autonomy are tempted to assuage this moral imperative by adopting an identity of dependence 
legitimated via medicalisation. In what Salmon and Peters have described as a social epidemic, 
persistent unexplained physical symptoms, or PUPS, may be triggered by a combination of media 
coverage of symptomology, medical consumerism and the rise of special interest groups, which 
together act to alter the perception of illness among a group of people who may be made vulnerable 
by interpersonal factors (Salmon and Peters, 2002). Hence identity disorders may proliferate as the 
medical profession colludes, albeit reluctantly, to shape these perceptions into legitimate pseudosyndromes 
by medicalising conditions that consumerism has defined as illness. 
 
Where the appropriate limits upon paternalistic interventions in public health might be in such 
a melange is a complex moral dilemma. A starting point is the distinction between the strong 
paternalism which overrides autonomous self-regarding decisions in the best interests of the wider 
society and that which protects the best interests of the dependent, whose autonomy is compromised. 
Another is the distinction between disability and ill health. The neutral conception of 
disability asserts that once impairment is remedied, the disabled will be enabled to participate in 
civic society from a position of full autonomy. Those suffering from chronic ill health, however, 
receive ongoing civic care in recognition of their compromised autonomy or dependence. In addition, 
normative approval or disapproval of choice in relation to movements between able bodied and 
disabled status, as well as between autonomous and dependent states, comes into question. 
We are of the view that the term transableism may help to conceptualise the behaviour of 
various heterogenous groups of people making claims on the public healthcare system, and where 
the acceptable limits of paternalism might lie in relation to them. If the public healthcare system is 
pictured as an umbrella, then the claimants appear to be distributed along five separate axes under its 
shelter. These are autonomy and dependence, able bodiedness and disability, known and unknown 
aetiologies, short-term and chronic ill health, and normative approval and disapproval. From the 
preceding discussion, it will appear self-evident that autonomous claimants with short-term health 
problems of known aetiology are likely to be associated with the least paternalism and the most 
normative approval. Commensurately, dependent claimants with chronic health problems of 
unknown aetiology are likely to be associated with the maximum paternalistic interventions and 
the least normative approval. The wealth of literature on the management of those with PUPS, often 
designated by pejorative terms such as heartsink patients, bears out this assertion (Carson et al., 2000; 
Mayou and Farmer, 2002; Salmon and Peters, 2002; Sharpe, 2002). Under a neutral conception of 
disability, degrees of able bodiedness would prove irrelevant to degrees of both paternalistic intervention 
and normative approval, as impairments would ground absolute claims to measures ensuring 
the ability to engage in civic participation. 
 
Various ethical concerns emerge from this taxonomy. Transableism may involve a desire to 
experience disability or dependence on a permanent or temporary basis. Those seeking medical 
assistance for a one-off procedure, such as those with BIID requesting amputation of a healthy limb, 
fall into a discrete category. According to the limited anecdotal evidence base available, once the 
amputation has taken place prostheses are adopted successfully, psychic suffering ceases and 
entrance into fully autonomous lives takes place as subjective and intersubjective notions of identity 
are congruent. Hence paternalistic intervention to prevent amputation of a healthy limb would 
appear to be unjustified. The cost to the rest of society of providing the prostheses would be slight 
compared to the seriousness of overriding a self-regarding action, regardless of whether the aetiology 
of BIID involves biomedical variation or the wish to have the identity of an amputee. The selfregarding 
choices many of us make which cause us to make long-term demands upon healthcare 
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resources, such as those where over-indulgence is implicated, are far more costly in economic terms, 
but remain immune to paternalistic prohibition. In addition, in simply financial terms, the resources 
needed to treat the emotional and physical damage caused by sufferers from BIID who attempt 
unsuccessfully to remove a limb themselves is substantial, as well as highly counterproductive. 
Yet where transableism involves the choice to assume an identity of dependence, and this is 
medicalised, as appears to be the case at least some of the time with PUPS, ethical choices over 
paternalism are more complex. PUPS are a significant public health problem found in all specialities, 
countries and cultures. A recent report by the Chief Medical Officer estimates their prevalence at 
20% of consultations, while research by Carson et al. suggests that 30% of neurology outpatient 
referrals are for PUPS, with the patients concerned experiencing significant impairment and distress, 
along with a poor prognosis (Carson et al., 2000; Dept of Health, 2002). An unknown proportion of 
PUPS may be viewed as an expression of transableism wherein patients use unexplained symptoms 
as a way of gaining a new identity that produces gain in their lives. We are aware of individuals who 
have adopted ‘disabled identities’ in order to swim in disability events and others who have become 
proficient wheelchair athletes after adopting a convincing life as paraplegics in whom no somatic 
disease process exists. Furthermore, it could be that the recent exposure of women falsifying their 
genetic history in order to obtain bilateral mastectomies represents another example of transabled 
identity seekers (Manchester Evening News, 2005). 
 
Yet transableism read as PUPS need not imply bad faith. Many of those with PUPS are undoubtedly 
afflicted with biomedical conditions whose aetiology will be ascertained at some time in the 
future. In addition, medicalisation is one of the very few refuges which allow us to request care 
and experience dependence outside the private sphere. Those who are unable to access supportive 
private spheres have every incentive to manifest unhappiness symptomatically, as do those whose 
spiritual needs for retreat and a sympathetic ear find solace in today’s secular society only in the 
surgeries of bemused general practitioners. The ethical dilemma for public health ethics in this arena 
is to identify means to foster transabilities which move away from disability and dependence to 
maximise autonomy and civic participation. These will inevitably involve paternalism in one form 
or another. 
 
The economic costs for the public health system of transableism and PUPs are high, perhaps 
sufficiently so to justify paternalistic intervention on the grounds of the cost to others. In our view, 
such initiatives should take different forms. Where transableism is concerned, the key questions 
concern not only aetiology but also reversability, and how this may be set in motion. There is an 
urgent need for an evidence base to establish what spectrum of factors may trigger the need to change 
identity, bodily form or health practices from abled to non-abled states of being, as well as the reverse 
journey from dependence to autonomy. Methods to assess a range of paternalistic public health 
measures are essential if medicine is to help patients move back to ableism, or to foster the autonomy 
of those experiencing dependence. In addition, if cyclicmovements between abled and non-abled states 
are involved, as may be the case with addiction, insight into the mechanisms involved would prove 
beneficial (Mackenzie, 2006). It is here that we believe that current theorising of disability may provide 
a valuable contribution in its emphasis not only on fostering autonomy through a neutral conception 
of disability, but also upon the need to formulate alternative truths which move beyond the equation 
of disability, difference and dependence. Listening to the diversity of voices within the many cultural 
factors associated with transableism and PUPS would, we believe, enable public health paternalism to 
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